

91.02.78 3.

GOVDOC

BRA

4001

No. 3

Topic-Aspect Report

&


Topic-Goal Report

on Political Institutions

*This is a preliminary working paper only.



Carl Sussman
Steve Browning
May 19, 1969



POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Physical

1) There exists a multiplicity of governmental units and special districts with jurisdiction over the area to be inhabited by the New Community. These include:

- a) the national government;
- b) Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
- c) Suffolk County;
- d) Boston City;
- e) Boston School Committee;
- f) Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
- g) Massachusetts Port Authority;
- h) Metropolitan District Commission.

(Meyerson and Banfield, Boston: the Job Ahead; Banfield and Derthick, A Report on the Politics of Boston; and This is Your Massachusetts Government.)

2) These different jurisdictions are defined geographically. Powers and responsibilities of these various governmental units and specific districts are frequently specialized. In very few cases does the geographic jurisdiction of these different units coincide. The multiplicity of government in this area, the lack of congruence of geographic responsibility and the specialization of functions make coordination of planning a complex task involving political friction between these bodies.

(Myerson and Banfield, Ibid.; and Banfield and Derthick, Ibid.)

3) Multiplicity of governments, each relatively independent and specialized, tends to remove these governments from political responsibility since the public finds it difficult to attach responsibility to any particular unit. (ACIR, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966.

p.7)

4) Local and special governments derive their authority and power from the state. Therefore, more effective organization of local governments require participation by the state government. (Ibid., p. 9.)

5) Local government in metropolitan areas are severely restricted in their ability to effectively govern because the metropolitan area is a functional whole which is

is characterized by an uneven distribution of social and economic costs which generally work to the disadvantage of the center city. (Ibid., p. 13)

Government

1) The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has traditionally exercised extensive control over their local affairs. Boston has been particularly restricted in this respect.

- The General Court (the State Legislature) is free to interfere in all local affairs. (Banfield and Derthick, This is your Massachusetts Government.) A recent constitutional amendment permits greater home rule, but no city has yet sought to take advantage of its provisions.
- The Governor appoints the members of the Finance Commission which is empowered to investigate city affairs. (Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit.)
- Only in the case of Boston, the Governor appoints members of the Licensing Board. (Ibid.)
- The Legislature dictates the source of the city's tax revenue. (Ibid)
- Metropolitan District Commission Commissioners are all appointed by the Governor. (Banfield and Derthick, op. cit.)
- Any citizen can petition the Legislature on any issue. This mechanism is frequently resorted to when city actions thwart the desires of local interests. (Ibid. and Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit.)
- Only in the case of Boston, the actions of the Zoning Commission are without effect for 12 months after record of the action has been filed with the Clerk of the Senate. (Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit.)
- The traditional dominance of the State Legislature over the City of Boston appears to be a product of the Yankee Republican control of the state government (which has since passed into the hands of Democratic control) and their political antagonism and mistrust of the Boston Irish Democrats. (Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics. New York: Random House, 1965. p. 40)
- There is a tendency in the General Court on questions concerning Boston for votes to be on party lines. This is a factor of Republican party cohesion on the State level. (Duane Lockard, New England State Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. pp. 155-156)

2) Party politics has a strong influence on decisions made at the State level. The two parties are different in "composition and to a degree in ideology, and they are in sharp competition," yet both are relatively moderate. (Ibid., p. 121.

--The Democratic party :

- a. is cohesive on the state level, but less so now that it has

gained control of the General Court.

- b. divided geographically, socially and ethnically.
- c. is moderate despite foreign stock support, in order to compete with the prestige of Republican candidates. (Ibid., p. 134)
- d. has only become a power to the state in the last 35 years. (Democrats won control of both Houses in 1958.)
- e. embodies a conflict between the issue oriented and prestigious liberals (Kennedy) and the more moderate and larger group concerned with political benefits. The predominance of the latter group is a factor in the party's moderate position relative to the party nationally.

--The Republican party:

- a. is more centralized and cohesive than the Democratic party, partly because it is now a minority party.
- b. is increasingly dependent on the middle-class of all backgrounds, going to the suburbs, then on to the Yankees for votes. (Ibid., p. 141.)
- c. like the Democratic party, tends to be moderate relative to its national party because it must appeal to the highly urban vote in Massachusetts and its tradition of liberal reformism.
- d. has become more open to ethnic groups --a trend which has been apparent in its "balanced tickets." The party centralization is also apparent in the quiet way in which the party selects its candidates. (Ibid., 147)

3) The primary system provides opportunities for the non-Irish, non-Boston Democrat to get on the ticket when the convention is dominated by this group. However, the convention-primary system also works in the reverse, i.e. when the convention puts together a balanced ticket, the Irish-Boston democrats can attack it through the primary. It is indicative of the factionalism in the Democratic party. (Ibid., p. 147 and discussion with Prof. Colcord.)

4) Broad interests tend to identify with a party as a "built-in" part of the party organization. Pressure groups do not necessarily lose anything by this practice. For example, while labor is an integral and indispensable component of the Democratic party, the Republican party has learned to respond to its pressures. (Ibid., p. 164) These pressure groups are not controlling since they tend to exercise their influence only on particular issues. Thus the church is only involved in moral issues, while labor is only concerned about labor issues. (Ibid., p. 165; Banfield and Derthick, A Report on the Politics of Boston. Cambridge: Joint Center, 1960.)

5) Relative to the City Council, the Mayor of Boston is "strong," but his authority is limited by other factors.

--Mayor has little influence over special districts like the MDC

in part because Boston is too small geographically to maintain functions most effectively performed in a metropolitan basis. This is true of most cities, but is particularly true of Boston.

- Mayor has little control over one of the City's most important and expensive functions --education. While the Mayor and the City Council have a largely negative and only partly budgetary review, the School Committee is independently elected and can apply influence through the State Legislature. (Meyerson and Banfield; Banfield and Derthick.)
- The BRA and Housing Authority are largely independent despite the fact that the Mayor makes appointments to these bodies. This is the case because the Mayor cannot "realistically" remove them. (Meyerson and Banfield) Since the Collins' Administration, the Mayor has exercised considerable control over the BRA.
- Antiquated and State imposed Civil Service System has resulted in limiting the Mayor's authority over City Departments. (Ibid)
- Since the Mayor is non-partisan, he has little influence on the state level, even when the Governor is a Democrat. The Mayor is frequently the political rival of other Democrats, particularly those from the City as a result of the non-partisan contests. (Banfield, Big City Politics. p. 41)
- Many city functions are carried out by large bureaucracies which reduce the power of the Mayor without reducing his responsibility. Bureaucracy: structures low capacities for adaptability and innovation. (Jack Meltzer, "The Urban Conflict," Urban Affairs Quarterly. vol. iii, no. 3, March, 1968.)

6) The City Council, composed of nine at-large members, has very little power.

- Council may not appropriate out of general revenue more than the Mayor recommends. The Mayor has an item veto on the budget, which cannot be overridden. Otherwise, a vote of 6 Councilors can override a veto. They have the authority to approve Mayoral appointments. (Banfield and Derthick)
- Council plays a largely review and therefore negative role in City government. (Banfield, op. cit., p. 41)
- Council is not generally blamed for governmental failures. Incumbents therefore rarely lose. (Ibid., pp. 41, 45.)
- Council's lack of power tends to strengthen the Mayor's authority.

7) While at-large representation is designed to provide a City-wide rather than a parochial perspective:

- Lack of power in Council makes this relatively meaningless.
- Tends to exclude the representation of minority groups in the Council. Boston politics is Irish and personal (although less so than it has traditionally been.) (Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. p. 6)
- The combined fact that the State Representatives, having the most localized constituencies and the easy access of the public to the General Court, results in local issues being dealt with on the State rather than the City level. (Banfield and Derthick, op. cit.)

--Council candidates do not get organizational support. They usually run as individual personalities. It has not generally been a stepping stone to higher office so that Councilors are not generally the best quality politicians. There is evidence that this trend is being reversed in Boston in much the same way as the traditionally poor quality mayor has given way to the "new style mayor." (Banfield, op. cit., p.46)

8) Special districts are congruent geographically with functional roles; are generally economical, but tend to operate independently of other governmental units. (Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit.; John C. Bollens, Special District Government in the United States. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.)

--The Massachusetts Port Authority is a largely independent body except that its director are appointed by the Governor and passage of enabling legislation is required by the State for issuance of revenue bonds. The MPA's fiscal independence has been characterized by conservatism which has in some respects negated the risk advantage inherent in a public investment. There is some indication that this conservatism has not contributed to the public interest at least in port development. (Mark W. Clark, State Government and Port Development in Boston. May 17, 1968, Unpublished B.S. Thesis, M.I.T.)

--MPA's independence of political control has tended to make it responsible only to the clientele of the functions which it controls rather than to the general public. (William Edward Onorato. The Massachusetts Port Authority Administration of Logan Airport: Independence from Political Control. Jan, 1969, Unpublished B.S. Thesis, M.I.T.)

--The MBTA is more responsive, particularly to the needs of Boston. The MBTA has an advisory board with the power to approve the budget, the appointment of the director and allocation of the deficit. Advisory board membership is based in debt share, thus Boston dominates this body.

9) Like the City Council, the at-large election of the School Committee tends to exclude representation of minority groups on that committee.

10) Suffolk County, which includes Boston, Revere, Chelsea and Winthrop is governed by the City of Boston. But since its functions are restricted to maintaining courts and correctional institutions, the City has little power. The County is financed entirely by the City of Boston. (Banfield and Derthick, op. cit.)

Social

I. Equal opportunity in the Building Trades Unions.

1. The most conservative and politically powerful unions in the Massachusetts AFL-CIO are the Building Trades Unions. They have won many positions in Boston city government, but not the state appointed positions. They are primarily concerned with labor issues. Factors limiting their power are:
 - Commitment to the Democratic party
 - Trade unions' conservatism
 - Emphasis on labor issues solely
 - Factionalism in the labor union indicative of factionalism of non-partisan politics in the city. (Banfield and Derthick, A Report on the Politics of Boston.)
2. The building trades unions have discriminated against the blacks. Equal opportunity in the unions has become an issue in the construction projects in Boston executed under federal contracts. The issue will probably be played out with the beginning of Model Cities construction in the City.
 - In the 26 building trades in Massachusetts there are 3,134 white apprentices and 58 black apprentices. Unions claim blacks are not qualified.
 - Model cities proposal called for the training of 2000 construction workers. The City Council approved the training of 200. The change is believed to be the result of union pressure. (John Herbers, "Model Cities Struggle: Black Jobless vs. Unions," New York Times, April 3, 1969. pp. 41, 74. vol. cxviii, no. 40,612.)
3. Action has begun in Boston to break color barriers in the building trades.
 - Last fall pickets successfully obtained black employment on the on the BHA housing for the elderly in Washington Park.
 - United Community Construction Workers has organized 350 blacks.
 - The new Urban League has a Labor Director who has been giving extensive attention to this problem.
 - The N.A.A.C.P. will test an alleged agreement between contractors and building trades unions nationally to have the unions do the hiring for the Model Cities construction. (Ibid.)
 - "Maximum opportunities" provision of Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (PL 89-754) will inevitably lead to a resolution of this conflict with the trades unions. ("Labor Threatens to Picket Hire-the-Poor Projects," AIA Journal. vol. 49, Jan., 1968. p. 10.)

--The framers (Robert Weaver of HUD) of the Model Cities clearly intended to use Model Cities funds as a means of opening the construction forces to blacks.

--Nationally the AFL-CIO is taking a rigid stand to maintain the present independence of the unions although the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department has endorsed the principle of equal opportunity. They see the issue as:

- a. Increasing labor force and therefore threatening job security of present union membership.
- b. There is some evidence of racism --e.g. claims that blacks are "unqualified."

("Labor Faces Model Cities Issue," Engineering News-Record, 12/7/67, vol. 179. pp. 79-80.)

4. The Federal Government is finding the Building Trades Unions control of the labor supply is increasing housing costs and limiting construction. A recent speech by HUD Secretary George Romney to the Building Trades Unions Conference was met with boos when he urged equal opportunity and an end to "union enforced curbs on productivity." ("Two Faces of Labor," New York Times Editorial Page. May 15, 1969. P. 46. John Herbers, "Romney Making his Great Impact Outside Government by Challenging U.S. Institutions," New York Times. May 15, 1969. p. 32.)

II. Political Alienation

1. There is some evidence of political alienation in Boston as in other cities. It is characterized particularly by a feeling of powerlessness (especially among lower class and less educated people) but also by meaninglessness, a lowering of norms and estrangement (particularly among higher income groups.) (Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. pp. 58, 66.)

--Powerlessness and normlessness are expressed through projection and identification with charismatic leaders, while meaninglessness and estrangement are expressed through rational activism and withdrawal. (Ibid., p. 75)

--Alienation can be overcome by a reorganization of the political structure which

- a. involves people directly in decision making.
- b. results in a more realistic notion of democracy. (Ibid.)

--There is some evidence, although minimal, that less ambitious programs are succeeding in reducing political alienation. Mayor White's victory over Louise Day Hicks, a candidate who was

appealing to the powerless white, working class voter, and the favorable reception of his program for 15 Little City Halls providing people with a link with government are cited to support this notion. (Robert Coles, "A Candidate for '72 or So," The New Republic. Oct. 26, 1968. pp. 18-21.)

- The powerlessness aspect of political alienation appears to be closely correlated with socio-economic status. Low SES groups do not participate in formal organizations because they come into contact with value sets which they do not understand. (Dale Roger Marshall, "Who Participates in What?" Urban Affairs Quarterly. Dec., 1968, vol. iv, no. 2. pp. 201-223.)
- Working class groups do not understand bureaucratic organization or object-orientation and therefore withdraw from formal organizations where they are likely to come in contact with these value sets. They tend to respond to feelings of powerlessness during times of change with authoritarian and violent reactions. (Herbert J. Gans. The Urban Villager. New York: Free Press, 1962. p. 265.)
- Only one American in 25 belongs to a political club or organization; 24% claim membership in an organization they think is involved in political or governmental affairs; 57% claim membership in a voluntary organization of any kind including religious ones and less than 8% attend political gatherings of any kind. 52% of those with incomes over \$7000 belong to at least one voluntary organization, while 24% with incomes under \$2000 belong to such organizations. "Some 53% of the professionals, proprietors, managers and officials belong to voluntary associations, but only 32% of the skilled laborers, and 21% of the unskilled. Organizational inequities such as these help us understand the paradoxical strength of 'special interests' in a democratic system formally designed to treat everyone alike." (Toward a Social Report, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969. pp. 87-88.) Levin's survey found the powerless voters expressing the belief that "...the community is controlled by a small group of powerful and selfish individuals." (Levin, op. cit., p. 58.)
- Toward a Social Report suggests that powerlessness can be remedied by an effort to "organize the weak, or weaken the strong..." (p. 88.)

III. Neighborhood Social Structures

1. Most Bostonians live in communities with fairly well-defined ethnic character." (Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics. New York: Random House, 1965. p. 38)

--Boston has a higher proportion of its population of foreign stock than any other large American city except New York. As of 1960, 45% of the population was of foreign stock; of these, more than 1/3 foreign born, and a little less than 2/3 native (second generation), foreign or mixed parentage. [This underestimates the ethnic character of the City since the Irish, for example, represents more than 74,575 in terms of their strong ethnic iden-

identity. The 1960 census shows 9.2% of the population being Negro. The percentage is much higher now.] (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Boston Massachusetts Census Tracts 1960. p. 14.) See Table A.

- The Irish (including many who have lived in Boston more than two generations) comprise more than half the City's population. They are dispersed throughout the City, but particularly in South Boston, Charlestown, Jamaica Plain, Dorchester and Brighton.
- Italians comprise about 8% of the population and live primarily in East Boston and the North End.
- Jews comprise 11% of the population and live in Dorchester, Mattapan, Allston and Brighton.
- Blacks comprise more than 9% of the population and live primarily in Roxbury and the South End.
- Yankees predominate in the Back Bay and Beacon Hill. (Banfield, op. cit., p. 38) See Table B.

2. Neighborhoods tend to be politically significant since they tend to be fairly homogeneous, a condition which permits the establishment of standards and consensus. (Suzanne Keller, The Urban Neighborhood. New York: Random House, 1968. p. 66)

- People tend to select neighborhoods because the residents show values, backgrounds, and/or characteristics held by them. (Wendell Bell, "The City, the Suburb, and a Theory of Social Change," The New Urbanization [ed. - Scott Greer])
- The higher proportion of any given group in an area, the greater the likelihood that members of that group will vote. (Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. Gelncoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959.)
- Levin found that a smaller percentage of Protestants and Jews voted in the 1960 Mayoralty election than Catholics, who, according to Banfield (op. cit., p. 38), comprise 2/3 of Boston's church affiliated population. Interestingly, a higher proportion of the Protestants and Jews than Catholics voted for what Levin has interpreted as a protest vote of the politically alienated. (Levin, op. cit., p. 66.)
- Any group is likely to become aware of its interests through contact with others with the same interests. This is known as the "clustering effect." (Irving S. Foldare, "The Effects of Neighborhood on Voting Behavior," Political Science Quarterly. vol. lxxxiii, no. 4, Dec., 1968. pp. 516-517)
- Conversely, exposure to people and groups holding conflicting interests retards crystalization of an individual's interests. Thus minority groups in an area tend to vote more as the dominant group, than like groups in other areas. (Ibid., p. 524-525.)
- Stable, homogeneous neighborhoods should be maintained. (Herbert Gans. The Urban Villager. New York: The Free Press, 1962. p. 267.)

IV. Minorities and Bureaucracy

1. Some city government bureaucracies do not represent the interests of minority groups because they become identified with a segment of the population which has most recently used that bureaucracy for ascendancy into the mainstream of American life and culture. (This theme is advanced tentatively here.)

- Members of the Boston School Committee have traditionally been Irish Catholics. All but one member now are Irish Catholics. (Peter Schrag, Village School Downtown. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967. pp. 7, 55, 56.) The Fire and Police Departments have also been branches of government in Boston that have been heavily peopled with Irishmen.
- It is generally believed by the blacks that they have not been treated fairly by the School Committee, in part because the black community has been unable to acquire an effective voice in the School Committee. (Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1967.)
- There have been some convincing discussions of the New York City school strike which argue that the large Jewish population of the City which used the school bureaucracy to rise in American society and still controls the bureaucracy, felt their control threatened by decentralization. (Jason Epstein, "The New York City School Revolt," The New York Review of Books. Oct. 10, 1968.) There may be a corresponding relationship in the case of Boston.
- There is evidence of this "ethnic possessiveness" of bureaucracies in Boston. For example, a comparative study of finances of eight cities showed Boston making the largest expenditure per capita for police and fire. The excess appeared to be for expenditures on personnel. Services did not seem to be any better in these departments in Boston than in the other seven cities. (Barry C. Watkins, A Study in Comparative Municipal Finances. Aug., 1967, M.I.T. Unpublished B.S. Thesis.)
- In both these departments pay raises denied by Mayor Collins' administration was voted by referendum despite the high tax rate in the City, a persistent issue in Boston.
- This might be one explanation for the apparent difficulty experienced by minority groups in dealing with bureaucracies. 87% of the whites expect "equal treatment" by administrative officials, whereas 49% of the blacks do. (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, op. cit., p.84.)

V. Decentralization and Community Control

1. "Reconciliation among the values in conflict [in the cities] is beyond achievement as long as the satisfaction demanded by a discontented portion of the population is dependent on the modification or alteration in the values of unyielding segments of the population." (Jack Meltzer, "The Urban Conflict," Urban Affairs Quarterly. vol.iii, no. 3, March, 1968. p. 8.)
2. Government authority has been lost in a large part of black urban neigh-

borhoods and the only way to restore this authority is to redistribute political power through some form of decentralization which permits community control. Both London and Tokyo have district systems which are responsible for local administration of some functions. (Nathan Glazer, "For White and Black, Community Control is the Issue," New York Times Magazine, April 27, 1969. pp. 49, 52; Milton Kotler, "Political Dssorder or Local Self-Government," Urban America: Goals and Problems. Subcommittee...p. 178.) Authority derives from the need for an institution's function. When the function has changed or the needs change, allegiances change and authority declines. (Robert A. Nisbet, "The Twilight of Authority," The Public Interest, no. 15, Spring, 1969. p. 5.)

3. Decentralization under present circumstances will fractionalize the community. (Irving Kristol, "Decentralization for What?", The Public Interest, no. 11, Spring, 1968. pp. 17-25.) The community is fractionalized because whites generally support institutions which cause segregation. Blacks are therefore giving greater emphasis to equality rather than integration. (Alan Altshuler, The Demand for Participation in Large American Cities. M.I.T.: Manuscript, Dec., 1968. p. 8.)
4. There seems to be a traditional bias for small local governments in America, e.g. Suburbia. (Ibid., p. 7)

Economic

- 1) Generally, greater control of local affairs, particularly by the federal government, has increased as a result of federal financing of local and state programs. (Morton Grodzins, The American System. Chicago: Rand, McNally and Co., 1966.) Guidelines applied as a prerequisite for appropriations of federal funds has put effective decision-making on broad policy matters in the hands of the federal government. Programs which are administered through the states also give that level of government an important role in decision-making.
- 2) A major role for the federal government in local affairs was the result of the inability of local (city) governments to finance local programs. (Robert Wood. 1400 Governments.)
- 3) Economic ownership and management of business are sources of power in Amer-

ican Society. This power allows persons or communities to move society to provide services people want. (Michael Brower. "The Promotion of Black Ownership of Business," M.I.T.: Preliminary Draft, Dec. 21, 1968. p. 9.)

4) Metropolitan economic and social disparities are made more acute by the "fiscal competition" between neighboring municipalities which is demonstrated by zoning laws and other land controls locally administered and competition for commercial economic bases. (ACIR, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism. p. 157.)

Humanistic Goals

1) Political institutions developed to plan and administer the New Community should be responsive to the public.

2) The political entity should be capable of redistributing costs.

3) There should be a governing body for the New Community composed of neighborhood districts.

4) There should be decentralization of functions wherever possible in order to permit community control.

5) Neighborhood units should be homogeneous and wherever possible have them planned by a representative sponsor.

6) Neighborhood districts should be formed in such a way that they will be adaptive to many different tasks.

7) The entity responsible for the entire New Community development should have a sufficient range of responsibility to permit it to resolve conflicts among competing interests and develop trade-offs between these interests.

8) All political institutions should remain in public control.

Political Goals

1) The governmental institutions connected with the development of the New Community and the governing of the New Community after development should be as fiscally independent of the state and constituent municipalities as possible.

2) The political unit responsible for the entire New Community should be led by an executive with strong leadership powers.

3) This unit should have sufficient power to make all decisions which do not

fall into broad policy category.

- 4) This unit should have access to substantial financial resources.
- 5) This unit should be large enough to benefit from the economies of scale.
- 6) This unit should have sufficient power for effective performance of its responsibilities.

Planning Goals

- 1) Governmental units established to develop the New Community should also have authority to plan an urbanization policy and plan for the development of the entire metropolitan area.
- 2) It should cover a broad geographical area which is functionally meaningful in terms of the establishment of such an urbanization policy., ie. eastern half of the state or the entire state.
- 3) This body should be designated by the state.
- 4) This group should be responsive to the public, but should have a degree of political independence.

Table A

POPULATION MAKE-UP OF BOSTON*

Total	697,197
White	628,704
Negro	63,165
Other Races	5,328
Born in Puerto Rico	612
Puerto Rican Parentage	343
Total Foreign Stock	317,064
Foreign Born	109,964
Native, Foreign, or mixed parentage	207,100
United Kingdom	19,998
Ireland (Eire)	74,575
Norway	1,335
Sweden	3,861
Germany	8,185
Poland	13,047
Czechoslovakia	542
Austria	2,436
Hungary	999
U.S.S.R.	31,971
Italy	59,025
Canada	55,480
Mexico	151
All Others	44,459

*From: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Boston, Mass. Census
Tracts, 1960, GP0, p. 14.

Table B

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Boston's Wards*

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Economic Status</u>	<u>other characteristics</u>
1	low-middle income	Italian
2	low income	Irish
3	low income	Mixed, Italian predominate
4	middle income	Yankee
5	Upper Income	Yankee
6	low-middle income	Irish
7	low-middle income	Irish
8	low income	Irish
9	low income	Irish and Negro
10	low-middle income	Irish
11	low-middle income	Irish
12	low-middle income	Negro and Jewish
13	low-middle income	Irish
14	low-middle income	Jewish
15	Middle income	Irish
16	Middle income	Irish
17	Middle income	Irish
18	Upper middle income	Mixed, Irish predominate
19	Upper middle income	Irish
20	Upper income	Mixed, Irish predominate
21	Upper-middle income	Irish and Jewish
22	Upper-middle income	Mixed, Irish predominate

* From: Levin, Murray B., The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 24.

Political Institutions

Carl Sussman
Steve Browning.

Physical

1) There exists a multiplicity of governmental units and special districts with jurisdiction over the area to be inhabited by the New Community. These include:

- a) the national government;
- b) Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
- c) Suffolk County;
- d) Boston City;
- e) Boston School Committee;
- f) Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
- g) Massachusetts Port Authority;
- h) Metropolitan District Commission.

(Meyerson and Banfield, Boston: the job ahead; Banfield and Derthick, A Report on the Politics of Boston; and This is Your Massachusetts Government.)

2) These different jurisdictions are defined geographically. Powers and responsibilities of these various governmental units and special districts are frequently specialized. In very few cases does the geographic jurisdiction of these different units coincide. The multiplicity of government in this area, the lack of congruence of geographic responsibility and the specialization of functions make coordination of planning a complex task involving political friction between these bodies. (Meyerson and Banfield, Ibid., and Banfield and Derthick, Ibid.).

Economic

Generally, greater control of local affairs, particularly by the federal government, has increased as a result of federal financing of local and state programs. (Grodzins, Morton, The American System, Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1966). Guidelines applied as a prerequisite for appropriation of federal funds has put effective decision-making on broad policy matters in the hands of the federal government. Programs which are administered through the states also gives that level of government an important role in decision-making.

A major role for the federal government in local affairs was the result of the inability of local (city) governments to finance local programs. (Wood, Robert, 1400 Governments).

Social

Boston voters feel somewhat alienated from the city's electoral process. Reasons for this may include the city's inability to control local functions, distrust of government as a result of a reputation of corruption in city politics and a lack of representation within the city for minority groups. This is manifested in voting patterns and small voter turn-out at local elections (Murry Levin, The Alienated Voter).

The administration of federally financed welfare programs has become increasingly uniform. Where a measure of discretion in this administration is permitted, there tends to be a great disparity in the administration depending on local administrator. Professional standards in this administration has been slow in taking root most notably because of civil service standards (Martha Derthick, "Intercity Differences in Administration of Public Assistance Program: The Case of Massachusetts", in Wilson, James Q., City Politics and Public Policy).

To reap advantages of citizen participation requires that decision-making power actually be put into the hands of citizens (Francis Piven in Citizen Participation in Urban Development, Ed. by Hans B.C. Spiegel, Center for Community Affairs, MIT Institute for Applied Behavioral Science.).

Government

1) The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has more control over local affairs than does any other state. Boston in particular has even less control of its local affairs than does any city or town within the state.

- The General Court (the state legislature) is free to interfere in all local affairs. There is no provision for "home rule". (This is Your Massachusetts Government.)
- The governor appoints the members of the Finance Commission which is empowered to investigate city affairs. (Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit.).
- Only in the case of Boston, the governor appoints members of the Licensing Board (Ibid.).
- The legislature dictates the sources of the city's tax revenue (Ibid.).
- The City Police Commissioner is appointed by the governor (Banfield and Derthick, op. Cit.).
- Metropolitan District Commission, Commissioners are all appointed by the governor (Ibid.).
- Any citizen can petition the legislature on any issue. This mechanism is frequently resorted to when city actions thwart the desires of local interests. (This is your Massachusetts Government and Meyerson and Banfield).
- Only in the case of Boston, the actions of the Zoning Commission are without effect for 12 months after record of the action has been filed with the clerk of the Senate (Meyerson and Banfield).

2) Relative to the City Council, the mayor of Boston is "strong" but his authority is limited by other factors.

- Mayor has little influence over special districts like the MDC in part because Boston is too small geographically to maintain functions most effectively performed on a metropolitan basis. This is true of most cities but is particularly true of Boston.
- Mayor has little control of one of the city's most important and expensive functions -- education. While the mayor and city council have a largely negative and only partial budgetary review, the School Committee is independently elected and can apply influence through the state legislature (Meyerson and Banfield, Banfield and Derthick).
- As a non-partisan city, the mayor can secure few political favors to gain cooperation within the city or with the state legislature (Meyerson and Banfield).
- The mayor and City Council are restricted in their control of the police commission to approving salary increases and size of the police force. The law requires that the city provide the department funds upon the request of the Commissioner (Banfield and Derthick).
- The BRA is largely independent despite the fact that the mayor makes appointments to that body. This is the case because the mayor cannot "realistically" remove them. (Meyerson and Banfield).
- Antiquated and state imposed civil service system has resulted in limiting mayor's authority over city departments (Ibid.)

Government - cont.

- 3) The City Council composed of nine at large members has very little power.
 - Council may not appropriate out of general revenue more than the mayor recommends. The mayor has an item veto on the budget which cannot be overridden. Otherwise, a vote of 6 councilors can override a veto. They have the authority to approve mayoral appointments (Banfield and Derthick).
- 4) While at large representation is designed to provide a city-wide rather than a parochial perspective:
 - lack of power in council makes this relatively meaningless;
 - tends to exclude the representation of minority groups in the council;
 - and the combined fact that state representatives, having the most localized constituencies and the easy access of the public to the General Court, results in local issues being dealt with on the state rather than the city level (Ibid.).
- 5) Special districts are congruent geographically with functional role; are generally economical but tend to operate independently of other governmental units (Meyerson and Banfield).
- 6) Like the City Council, the at large election of the school committee tends to exclude representation of minority groups on that committee.
- 7) Suffolk County, which includes Boston, Revere, Chelsea and Winthrop is governed by the city of Boston. But since its functions are restricted to maintaining courts and correctional institutions, the city has little power. The county is financed entirely by the city of Boston (Banfield and Derthick).

GOVERNMENT

As we have indicated earlier, new communities offer an excellent opportunity to try innovative concepts of governmental organization and resident participation in the planning and operation of the city. Such techniques, while frequently not new in concept, are difficult to implement in existing cities due to entrenched political and social modes of behavior.

New participatory governmental approaches for New Communities fall roughly into these categories

1. What are the functions and services that government must perform? How can these best be met? How can the service role of government be separated from the essential political, or conflict-resolving role?
2. What initial framework could be established during the development period that would make it possible for the final residents to determine how they would most like to govern the city?
3. What governmental mechanisms might function most equitably and efficiently during and after the development of the New Community? What are the legal constraints to their use? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism and how do they compare in producing the desired level of resident participation and control over financing and policy making?

- I. The first approach grows from the separation of all governmental functions into four jurisdictional areas and evaluating how each might best be performed. This is perhaps a 'systems' approach in which the goals of each activity are evaluated. The functions might fall in the following areas:

- A. Basic education, welfare, health care, housing policy, recreation policy, libraries.
- B. "Line" functions: Police, fire, sewage, water, utilities, recreational facilities, public works, transit, refuse, emergency, building inspection.

- C. "Staff" functions: General administration, research and analysis, data collection, human relations.
- D. Social: Community identity, political behavior, clubs, organizations.

In order to arrive at the best governmental arrangement for each function they must be weighed according to the most efficient and equitable solutions. Then the function can be outlined as follows:

- A. Basic needs or goals.
- B. Facilities required.
- C. Services offered.
- D. Personnel required.
- E. Internal organization.
- F. Method of operation.
- G. Financing.
- H. Method for control.

II.

Another approach to governmental arrangements is to ignore fixed forms or procedures and really define a clear arrangement needed to build the new town and a clear self-dissolving mechanism once a certain level of development is reached. This has two advantages: first, it provides the developer with a small policy-making board that can act quickly during development while deferring the difficult task of creating a long term governmental structure; second, it makes it possible for the new town to become part of the surrounding government (city, county, etc.) while maintaining fiscal and political autonomy during development. The first is an attribute because it will allow the residents to create their own governmental institutions. The second has the benefit of allowing a more flexible planning-developmental arrangement than the surrounding government would allow permanently.

We are faced with the task of creating a policy-making board that will represent the interests of the developer, the financiers, the local public officials, surrounding residents, and above all, the future residents of the New Community. There must be a partnership among these five groups without creating too much power for any one. (Park Forest, Illinois, for example, was forced to revise its plans when early residents achieved too much control.)

The issue of citizen participation during the developmental stages is not easily resolved. The conflict revolves around a desire for the residents to be involved in decisions that affect their lives, offset by the developers need to retain a sufficient degree of insulation in order to maintain the integrity of the plan. Briefly, the arguments can be outlined as follows:

We must ultimately conclude that no single group can or should be given decision-making power in the planning stages. One solution might be to develop a joint public-private non-profit corporation. Such a body's primary responsibility would be to make fiscal arrangements for the New Community, thus insulating the surrounding area from the development costs. This is the arrangement used in the British New Towns where a Development Corporation transferred its assets to the local government when the development process was finished. However an important difference would be the involvement of the public-private corporation in the development of all facilities and the later role to public agencies (schools, sewers, roads, etc.)

III.

A third approach to the need for a representative and efficient governmental mechanism is to look at real examples or theoretical arrangements for decision-making that will continue from the planning through the operation of the New Community. During our discussion it will be necessary to ask how each arrangement allows for resident participation in the governmental process.

A. The first arrangement is the development of a special Service District. This legal shelter is used to permit the New Community to levy higher taxes than the surrounding areas. The main advantage to the Service District is its flexibility to create varying degrees of isolation. This can range from

- a. A fiscal arrangement for a higher tax level while retaining legal dependencies on the surrounding area to
- b. The creation of a District that provides all services and facilities and acts as a separate municipality with its charter and government.

This arrangement has four distinct advantages:

1. Residents are able to provide the higher level of services they desire.
2. Political battles are avoided in gaining local approval and tax increases.
3. Residents can decide whether they wish to run their own services once the New Community is in operation.
4. Formal control over each service can be in the hands of the surrounding jurisdiction or the Service District Board.

The primary disadvantage seems to be the problem of financial lag in which facilities must be financed before an economic base can be developed. The Service District has no legal powers to sell bonds.

B. The second arrangement is to incorporate the New Community as a Separate Municipality. While this has many advantages of legal autonomy and decentralization, there are three serious problems.

1. The land must be contiguous. Unowned pieces of land within the New Community borders will face awkward legal problems.
2. This arrangement would allow controlling power to be captured by the early residents. This would give them the right to alter the overall plan (increasing taxable land and nearby amenities) for their own benefit and not for the good of future residents.
3. This ignores the New Community's relations to the surrounding areas, resulting in unfavorable resentment and a failure to ease the fiscal problems of the existing cities.

C. The third arrangement is best characterized by a Lockean Social Contract. Under this system the developer might begin with one vote for each plot of land. Each new resident owner would receive one vote when he buys a home. This technique has one particular advantage: It provides an easy turn-over or transition from development to an operating government. Such a Social Contract could be valuable when dealing only with the political function of government, but could be less appropriate for carrying out the service functions (which could be left to the surrounding area government.)

A unique variation of this technique has been instituted at Columbia, Maryland. All residents are required to pay 75¢ per \$100 assessed valuation. The money goes to finance the work of the Columbia Park and Recreation Association. This group deals with all the service functions of government not ordinarily provided by the county: everything from landscaping and recreational facilities to day-care centers and the mini-bus system.

The Association is initially composed of a 15 man board (members of the development staff.) Annual community elections are held and one board member is selected for each 3000 residents. This staging guarantees that the developer will retain primary control during the early years of development. In addition to this replacement process, one original board member will automatically resign each year beginning in 1976. This will guarantee a community-run Association by the early 1980's.

D. The alternative is always available to work within the surrounding governmental structure. Perhaps the best arrangement using this approach would be for the developer to provide all the necessary facilities and sell them to the general

them to the local public agencies, thus eliminating the inevitable red tape and delays. This approach has three fundamental disadvantages.

1. There is limited opportunity for resident participation and control of various services.
2. There is inadequate fiscal isolation from the surrounding municipality, so either
 - a. The New Community will be limited to the level of services available.
 - b. The surrounding taxes will be forced up.
 - c. The New Community will end up suffering from the same fiscal problems as the existing area.
3. There will be huge constraints on innovation in the New Community due to continual compromises with existing authorities.

E. The final alternative to be discussed is a relatively new legal hybrid called an Improvement District. The best known example is the Estero Municipal Improvement District being used in the development of Foster City, California. In essence, the Municipal Improvement District (MID) is a glorified form of the Social Contract mechanism mentioned above. Each owner receives votes equal to the assessed value of his land. This gives the developer the controlling vote until a majority of the land has been sold. The primary advantage of this arrangement (as approved by the California legislature in 1960) is the legal right to sell bonds, levy taxes, and operate public works. Other advantages are summarized as follows:

1. The developer keeps the power through the critical development period.
2. There is an easy transition to community control.
3. It is possible to expand the "new town" jurisdiction over any existing residential neighborhoods.
4. There is fiscal isolation from the surrounding area.
5. It frees the New Community from the level of services of the surrounding area.
6. It puts all decisions into private hands, thus creating a town meeting.
7. The MID is free to establish contracts with surrounding towns or counties for other services.

There are, of course, many disadvantages to this arrangement. Many are implicit in the advantages, depending on one's viewpoint (power to the developer, decisions in private hands, etc.) Other problems are:

1. The MID creates a special level of government that can only complicate an already complex system of jurisdiction.
2. There is no guarantee that the developer's interests will be related to those of the residents in the early stages of building.
3. The MID may not relate the facilities and broad planning to the surrounding area.
4. It is easy to overextend financially because the funding is not subject to the constraints that force most developers into constant economic evaluation.
5. The New Community may have an inadequate tax base to sustain itself once development is complete.

THE NEW INVESTORS

The upsurge in American new community development has been characterized by the recent involvement of large private building interests. The private developer may follow one or more of the following alternatives:

1. Sell developed land to individual builders.
2. Engage directly in home building.
3. Sell to real estate firms who will use the land for income property.
4. Retain some sites for his own investment income (sites can be leased or privately run.)

Traditionally, new community development has been undertaken by private developer-builders. Park Forest, Illinois, is typical of this type of project because its land was assembled with the sole interest of creating a single, profitable development. Subsequent projects by developer-builders have expanded their goals but the techniques of land acquisition and the goals of profitability are the same. Columbia and Foster City are noted examples.

The new breed of investors include (1) large national corporations; (2) large land owners; and (3) mortgage lenders.

The increasing involvement by large corporations in the new community field grows from a desire to stimulate product sales as well as from more subtle efforts to find tax shelters and comply with anti-trust regulations. The recent involvement of several firms has grown primarily from the search for markets and testing grounds for new products. A partial listing includes: Westinghouse's involvement at Coral Springs, Florida General Electric's new Community Systems Development Division, Boise - Cascade's acquisition of Perma-Built Enterprises, and U.S. Land Corporation I.T.T.'s stock purchase of Levitt and Sons. Anti-trust regulations have forced Kaiser Aluminum to set up Westwood Properties and the American Cement Company to back a recent Janss resort development (Snowmass-at-Aspen) thus creating more "vertical" integration in their activities. Similarly, anti-trust regulations have forced large corporations like the Pennsylvania Railroad to sell holdings, leaving them with large investment resources which are free to be directed into areas unrelated to their direct interests.

Gulf Oil, Humble Oil and Sunset International Petroleum have recently entered the new community field due to the unique tax shelters in the oil industry. These include depletion and depreciation allowances, capital

gains provisions, property tax, and interest deductions. A similar tax approach can be seen in the initial investment at Reston. Robert Simon's involvement at Reston began in 1960 when his firm realized nearly four million dollars in capital gains for the sale of Carnegie Hall. In order to postpone the capital gains tax, he must put his profits into replacement property --6000 acres of land outside of Washington, D.C.

The second group of new community investors are the mortgage lenders who are assuming a role as an equity investor. Favorable terms are frequently arranged so that lending institutions can gain options to purchase shares in the development and achieve a voice in the management. Connecticut General's growing role at Columbia led to its appointment of a majority of the board of directors and purchase of half of the controlling stock.

The third group becoming deeply involved in new community development are the large land holders. Groups like the Irvine Company, Janns, the Mission Viejo Company, and the Valencia developers (Newhall LandCo.) have held large tracts of land until its value has risen, making farming or extractive operations less profitable. Other corporations like Goodyear have been pulled into the new community field almost by accident, primarily because of the high holding costs of their own large land tracts. Rising property taxes and land values have led to Goodyear's conversion of Litchfield Park, Arizona, into a new town of 13,000 acres.

While it is apparent that there are many motives involved in the decision to invest in the new community field, the overriding consideration seems to be its profitability. This has almost universally led to compromises in the developers' varying degree of social concern and innovative techniques. Compromises have generally led to reduced amenities (open space, recreational opportunities, or special institutional arrangements), higher density, and the reduction of programs (especially housing) directed toward lower income residents.

